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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the social impacts and legacies expected for Rio de 
Janeiro as the Brazilian city prepares to host the 2016 Olympic Games.  The analysis is focused 
on four aspects: urban regeneration, people displacement, sport participation and nationalism.  
These are some of the claims used by sporting mega-events proponents (government and elite 
groups) to justify the public spending on the spectacle. 
 
Introduction 
 
Rio de Janeiro. October 2nd, 2009.  Millions of people were anxiously waiting a result – some at home 
watching on TV, some at Copacabana beach where a stage was set.  The result came: Rio de Janeiro 
was announced as the winning candidate on the bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics.  The city and 
the country began celebrating the long awaited choice (Rio had previously bid for the 2004 and the 
2012 Olympic Games). Now, it was finally Rio’s turn! 
 
Brazil, June 17th, 2013.  It all began with an increase in bus fares across the country.  Tired of paying 
high taxes and seeing no return in the form of better public services, Brazilians decided to ‘wake up’ 
from a state of social numbness, go to the streets, and show to politicians, fellow citizens, tourists, and 
the world that they would not ‘take it’ anymore.  During the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, soccer 
celebration was replaced by violent protests resulting in a generalized riot against sporting mega-
events in Brazil (2014 FIFA World Cup Finals and 2016 Summer Olympics), which became the 
‘scapegoat’ of all social problems in the country (Kfouri, 2013; Reuters, 2013). 
 
Episodes like the ones above-described make clear that sporting mega-events have already had social 
impacts on Brazil.  Politicians and public administrators expect that the 2016 Olympic Games will help 
to better the country’s position as an important global economy.  At the same time, the local population 
expects social improvements as a consequence of the investment of public money in the Games.  In 
this chapter, we focus on social impacts that have already been experienced and on the legacies that are 
expected as a result from hosting the 2016 Olympics.  The real impact of the Games and legacies 
cannot be examined in here, as this chapter was written well before the Olympics in Rio.  However, it 
is possible to demonstrate that the development projects follow a similar pattern undertaken by other 
host cities, complying with the demands of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).  For the 2016 
Olympic Games in Rio, we focused on four social impacts: urban regeneration, people displacement, 
sport participation and nationalism. 
 
Sporting Mega-Events: Legacies and Social Impacts 
 
Tomlinson and Young (2006) argue that the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics are the 
biggest platforms to showcase nations worldwide. What they represent to host cities and countries goes 
beyond the scoreboard and the podium.  For some countries, to host a mega-event is seen as a way for 
rehabilitation and regeneration. In the last two decades, sporting mega-events grew so much in size and 
importance because of the promotional appeal for host cities (Horne &Manzenreiter, 2006), that are 
transformed into ‘urban entertainment destinations’ – UEDs (Hannigan, 1998). Opportunities to 
become an UED also caught the attention of developing nations which have seen the mega-events as 
their chance to better position themselves in the global economy.  For many urban centers, economic 
growth is now led by “consumption, recreation, tourism, and the provision of services” (Rosentraub, 
2000, p. 219).  The culture of consumption has commodified leisure activities, including recreational 
travel, and created a need for “the generation of constant change and novelty” (Britton, 1991, p. 454), 
as well as the production of tangible goods and intangible labor-services, which represent the purchase 
of a life-style (Britton, 1991). 
 
The desired goals of sporting mega-events include “the expansion of trade, creation of an international 
image in the mind of the corporate community of a location with suitable status and infrastructure from 
which to base corporate operations, land development, tourism development, and downtown renewal” 
(Britton, 1991, p. 471).  These goals, in turn, according to the claims made by proponents of mega-
events in justifying public spending, should help strengthen national identity and generate social and 
economic development.  Although of short-term duration, these spectacles have long-term 
consequences, and, therefore, are seen by urban leaders as channels for solving problems (Roche, 
1994).For Sugden and Tomlinson (1998), sporting mega-events are an irresistible opportunity to 
revitalize urban infrastructures and to articulate and celebrate national pride. 
 
In hosting sporting mega-events, cities’ proponents expect positive impacts and legacies.  Some 
authors consider impacts and legacies as synonymous (e.g., Dickson, Benson, & Blackman, 
2011; Preuss & Solberg, 2006; Solberg & Preuss, 2007), while others analyze impacts and 
legacies as different concepts (e.g., Hiller & Wanner, 2011; Jones, 2001).  Impacts are usually 
assumed to happen before, during, and after events. Legacies, on the other hand, are defined as 
future benefits that can last after the event (Solberg &Preuss, 2007).  Although impacts are very 
important and should be discussed, tangible and intangible legacies have become the field on 
which boosters and critics battle to support their ideas (Horne, 2010).  The term legacy is now 
part of the charter of the IOC (Dickson, Benson & Blackman, 2011), becoming, thus, the key 
word used by mega-events proponents in order to guarantee support from different segments of 
the local society.  As noted by Dickson et al. (2011), in a recent symposium on legacies 
conducted by the IOC, it was acknowledged that defining legacy is difficult because the concept 
has been used in different contexts.  The literature has considered either three broader aspects – 
economic, social and environmental (Hritz& Ross, 2010; Kim &Petrick, 2005; Yoon, Gursoy, & 
Chen, 2001) – or seven specific dimensions of legacy – economic, tourist, environmental, 
cultural, psychological and political (Preuss& Solberg, 2006). 
 
For many previous investigations (e.g., Deccio & Baloglu, 2002; Ritchie, Shipway, & Cleeve, 
2009; Zhou &, Ap, 2009), the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) has offered a suitable 
theoretical framework to explain the importance of legacy of sporting mega-events.  Basically, 
authors believe that local residents will support a mega-event in their community if they perceive 
that such mega-event will generate positive legacies for them.  In addition, other studies 
(Girginov & Hills, 2008; Ohmann, Jones, & Wilkes, 2006; Waitt, 2003) have indicated that 
social impacts deserve a special attention in the exchange process. 
 
A consensual definition of social impact does not exist (Ohmann et al., 2006).  However, some 
authors have agreed that social impact should take into account consequences and changes in the 
quality of life of the residents of the host communities (Brunt & Courtney, 1999; Girginov & 
Hills, 2008; Ohmann et al., 2006). Therefore, social impacts of mega-events include all changes 
made in preparation for staging such event and affect somehow the quality of life of the 
residents.  Social impacts can be positive or negative.  Ritchie et al. (2009), for example, 
reported both positive (e.g., inspiring young people to play sports) and negative (e.g., disruption 
of daily lives) social impacts as consequences of hosting the 2012 London Games.  An example 
of positive social impact happened in Barcelona. The host of the 1992 Olympic Games is often 
cited as an example of success, because the Games established Barcelona as a competitive global 
city (Kennett & Moragas, 2006).  One of Barcelona’s main achievements with the Games was 
the global re-positioning of the city, placing it on Europe’s cultural map (Berne, 1998; 
Hornblower, 1990); )  Furthermore, the Games granted the city gentrification, illustrated by 
redevelopment of the city’s waterfront (Hornblower, 1990) and the rehabilitation of more than 
200 parks, plazas, streets of neglected older neighborhoods (Glueck, 1987). 
 
Part of the positive perception from residents can be attributed to the ‘feel good’ effect (Maennig& 
Porsche, 2008), that is, the pleasure derived from a sporting event on participants, attendees, 
volunteers, or simply citizens that are surrounded by the event (Kavetsos & Szymanski, 2008).  When 
hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals, Germany relied on the ‘feel good’ effect to make the event 
one of the most important events ever hosted in the country (Maenning& Porsche, 2008), which  
strengthened  the country’s image (Grix, 2012) and created  a newfound pride in being German (Sark, 
2012). Despite criticisms, mainly related to people displacement (Pillay & Bass, 2008), the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup in South Africa offers another good example. At the end of the competition, residents’ 
perception was that the event “increased their sense of pride, social cohesion, and self confidence” 
(Knott, Allen & Swart, 2012, p. 118). 
 
Urban Regeneration 
 Urban regeneration is part of every mega-event host city’s agenda since Barcelona hosted the 1992 
Olympic Games and became an example of how to achieve global positioning by focusing on local 
development.  Now, every host city wants to follow the ‘Barcelona Model’ or be even better – a 
guarantee given by Rio’s mayor, Eduardo Paes (Mendes, 2013).  The reason behind improving 
infrastructure, transportation, communication system and social areas lies on the economy, for these 
are “features that attract capital and talent as to a place to live, work and do business” (Howell, 2005, 
p. 64). 
 
But after the 1992 Olympics, there has been no report of urban regeneration success credited to the 
Games from any other host city (Atlanta ’96, Sydney 2000, Athens ’04, Beijing ’08, and London ’12).  
The Chinese city of Beijing focused almost exclusively on its ‘look’ as a global city, in which 
impoverished residential areas were turned into gentrified spaces and “the construction of buildings 
whose function was to increase the circulation of both symbolic and investment capital” (Ren, 2011, as 
cited in Barker, 2013, p. 2).  The British capital used the Olympics to regenerate London East Side, a 
less developed region.  However, what marked the process was the eviction of residents and small 
businesses around the Olympic Park, contradicting the promise of economic growth for the area 
(Coaffee, 2012).  Even Barcelona has failed in transforming the waterfront Olympic Village into 
affordable housing for low-income families (Garcia-Ramon &Albet, 2000). 
 
Rio de Janeiro, as many other Brazilian cities, has long waited for urban regeneration projects – some 
dated from 1965 (Marques, 2013) that stumbled in local, state and federal government bureaucracy.  
The 2016 Games is regarded as a mean to prioritize these projects.  But besides only investing in top of 
the line sporting facilities and attraction for tourists, the city’s projects should target many areas, 
including all favelas (slums).  In this sense, Rio’s development policies follows what Howell (2005) 
suggests as right strategies: “reaching into all neighbourhoods to ensure creative opportunities and 
investment strategies … developing citywide spaces and places that stimulate creative capacity and 
innovation for all citizens” (p. 65), as a way of encouraging economic growth. 
 
Rio’s mayor has stressed that the infrastructure work, particularly for the Olympic Park, is being done 
through public-private partnership for the first time in Olympic history (Mendes, 2013).  And he notes 
that the transformations will become legacies: “I do not want to build an aquatic park worth trillions of 
dollars to then become a ‘white elephant’. The transformations are for the population and not for the 
foreign visitors to see” (Paes, as cited in Mendes, 2013, freely translated). 
 
The city is promising that the projects will reflect on an improvement of quality of life for low income 
communities, including the construction of new residential areas, such as Bairro Carioca that will 
house 10 thousand people victims of floods caused by the rains, or residents from risky areas from the 
North Zone (CidadeOlímpica, Social, n.d.).  Another program considered one of the most important 
legacies of the Games is Morar Carioca, which consists of social integration of all of Rio’s favelas, 
benefiting 55 communities and more than 200 thousand people.  A re-urbanization process at a cost of 
R$ 8 billion (about US$ 3.5 billion), that should be done by 2020, consists of works “in infrastructure, 
landscaping, implementation of leisure and educational equipment… transforming the area that was 
considered of risk into safe places for the population” (CidadeOlímpica, Social, n.d.). Porto Maravilha 
(Marvelous Port) is considered the largest urban regeneration project in Brazil (CidadeOlímpica, 
Infrastructure, n.d.) and it has been in the city’s plans since the 1970s.  The idea is to revitalize five 
million square meters of the harbor in a center for cultural and gastronomic activities, attracting new 
companies and residents to a previously abandoned historic region.  The project consists of complete 
demolition of Perimetral Overpass, which will be replaced by expressways, underground road and 
tunnels, two museums, and a new boulevard. 
 
Rio Operation’s Center should integrate the city’s everyday life management through 560 cameras 
installed all around the city (CidadeOlímpica, Infrastructure, n.d.).  It is regarded as a legacy in public 
safety, making possible to “to check data, cross maps and, in extreme situations, plan evacuation 
possibilities, calling the responsible teams to solve the problem in the shortest amount of time” 
(CidadeOlímpica, Infrastructure, n.d.). 
 
In the public transportation department, Rio’s projects of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, Light Rail 
Transit (LRT) system, subway, trains and ferry boats encompass R$ 20 billion (about US$ 8.5 billion) 
and are expected to be ready by 2016, being considered the most important legacy of the Games 
(Magalhães& Schmidt, 2013), increasing the transportation capacity from 18% to 63%.  From the 
North Zone to the West Zone, the Olympic City will be interconnected through the BRT.  In 
downtown Rio, LRT will connect to TransBrasil and other means, such as ferries and subways, 
optimizing the traffic in the region.  “In the Providencia, the city’s first favela, a chair lift will make 
going up the hill something easier, apart from providing a beautiful view of the Guanabara bay and 
downtown to residents and visitors” (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation,n.d.).  LRT trains should start 
operating in Downtown Rio mid-2015 with six lines, 42 stations, one of each being Santos Dumont 
Airport, encompassing a total of 30 kilometers of track (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation,n.d.).  The 
city of Rio will pay almost R$ 6 million (about US$ 2.6 million) a month to the operating company for 
25 years of contract, and, to ensure its viability, the city offered as guarantee a municipal public land, 
valued at R$ 144,4 million (US$ 62 million), as part of the real state fund for the project (Bastos, 
2013).  There will be also three expressways serviced by BRT system: TransOeste, which will have 
56km of extension in the West Zone of Rio; TransCarioca, which will have 39km of extension, 
connecting Barra da Tijuca (the richest neighborhood of the city) to Ilha do Governador (where the 
international airport Tom Jobim is located); and TransOlympic, which will have 23km of extension and 
will connect two main Olympic competition zones: Deodoro and Barra da Tijuca favoring 400 
thousand people daily by reducing commuting time from 1hour and 50 minutes to 40 minutes, in 
average (CidadeOlímpica, Transportation, n.d.). 
 
Environmental projects, such as a new center for residual treatment, are part of the plans for Rio 2016, 
to be another legacy for the population after the end of the Games, Favelas such as Chapéu Mangueira 
and Babilônia will receive housing units made with materials that use sustainable techniques 
(CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.).  Madureira neighborhood has already got some benefits by the 
construction of the third largest park in the city (CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.), offering 
recreational, sporting and cultural activities.  The West Zone of Rio, where most of the Olympics’ 
competitions will take place, is going through processes of cleaning and sanitation of its lagoon 
system, composed of 14 rivers of the Bacia de Jacarepagua (CidadeOlímpica, Environment, n.d.).  
Lastly, the West Zone of Rio and the region surrounding the city of Rio should be benefit by 
reforestation of seven million trees (the largest reforestation in Latin American to date) around the 
Petrochemical Complex of Rio de Janeiro by Petrobras (the Brazilian state-run oil company) until 
2016 (Leite, 2013).  The project is part of Rio’s plans of planting 24 million trees to neutralize carbon 
emissions during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. 
 
While most of the above-mentioned urban regeneration legacy projects are still on paper, reports and 
concerns about delays have been the main subject on the media.  The Federal Court of Audit informed 
that between 2010 and 2012, only R$ 92 million (about US$ 40 million) were invested for the Games, 
contrary to the R$ 1,6 billion (about US$ 700 million) promised to be invested in that same period by 
the Ministry of Sports (Magalhães, 2013).  That Court also mentioned that lack of solid plans 
concerning legacy could cause “errors such as those that led to the bursting of the budget of the 2007 
Pan-American Games and other events held throughout the country” (Magalhães, 2013). 
 
In September 2013, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) demanded from Rio more agility 
regarding transportation, infrastructure and hospitality (Figueiredo, 2013).  The IOC was assured by 
the Rio Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (ROCOG) that everything was on schedule and 
that the city would be ready for the Games (Figueiredo, 2013). The IOC’s vice-president, John Coates, 
did not demonstrate any confidence, and, three years before the Games, he had already expressed 
being sure that Rio would not be ready on time to offer proper facilities for some modalities, and  some 
delegations would not be able to stay at the Village (because the competition sites are too far away). 
(Coates, as cited in Linden, 2013). 
 
People Displacement 
People displacement has been an issue of concern since Seoul hosted the 1988 Olympic Games, 
when 720,000 people were displaced as part of the preparation process (Bulman, 2007).  The 
most impressive report about people displacement was published as a consequence of 
preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  The Switzerland-based Center on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) reported that, in March of 2008, 1.25 million Chinese people had been 
displaced in preparation for the Games (Battan, 2008).  Since then, COHRE has proposed a 
guideline for Olympic host cities as an attempt to protect housing rights of local residents 
(COHRE, 2007).  Although the problem was not as severe as in Beijing, evictions were reported 
in London 2012, too.  Five years before the London Games, COHRE reported that 1,000 family 
houses were already under threat of demolition (COHRE, 2007).  After the Games, it was noted, 
for example, that over 400 residences were demolished in Stratford, East London in preparation 
for the 2012 Olympics (Watt, 2013). 
 
Figures concerning people displacement in Rio de Janeiro as preparation for the 2016 Olympics 
are still blurry.  More pessimistic estimates have mentioned that around 70,000 residents have 
been or will be removed from their houses in Rio (Crumpler & Steiker-Ginzberg, 2013; Romero, 
2012).  So far, these are only estimates.  However, reports published by the Associated Press 
show that, in 2010, municipal housing authority made 6,927 evictions and paid resettlement costs 
in 88 different neighborhoods across Rio de Janeiro city (Barbassa, 2012).  Activists and 
politicians have criticized not only the evictions, but also the money offered for resettlement 
(US$ 16,000 per house), which they asserted was far from enough to find another home to live in 
Rio (Barbassa, 2012).  This is partially a reflection of real estate speculation, which has made 
prices of properties soared in Rio, after this city was chosen to host the 2016 Games (Brasileiro 
& Millard, 2012). 
 
In the Vila Autódromo slum, at Barra da Tijuca neighborhood, there have been frequent attempts 
to displace 4,000 low income inhabitants.  This would be only another case of eviction among 
many others in Rio, if this slum was not located in the exact place chosen to be the Olympic 
Park, the setting for major sport venues in Rio 2016.  In 2009, when Rio was elected as the host 
of the 2016 Games, the city’s authorities announced that thousands of families in six slums, 
including Vila Autódromo, would be removed as part of the preparation for the Games 
(Sorensen, 2013). Nevertheless, Vila Autodromo has been an interesting case because its 
dwellers have resisted eviction since then. Other slums have been ‘successfully’ moved by the 
city’s government, but Vila Autodromo has become a focus of resistance against people 
displacement in Rio. As time goes by, the political power of its residents seems to increase.  For 
example, when the official plan1 for the Olympic Park was designed, it proposed the preservation 
of the Vila Autódromo community (Sorensen, 2013).  However, the ‘battle’ is not over: Rio 
city’s authorities insist that this community needs to be removed because now it is located in a 
“risk area”, as a consequence of the expansion of two roads that will be built close to the slum 
(Sorensen, 2013). 
 
Beyond Vila Autódromo, many other cases of evictions are reported in Rio de Janeiro.  Besides 
evictions, poor communities have gone through a complete restructuration, which some have 
called a mere ‘lipstick and mascara’, in order to accommodate the Olympics (Sorensen, 2013).  
Currently, the city watches a process of ‘pacification’ of the slums, involving military personnel 
supposed to take control of some areas dominated by drug dealers (Kumar, 2012). 
 
Sport Participation 
 
Stimulating sport participation has been recognized as one of the most desirable legacies of 
hosting the Games (Minnaert, 2012).  Sport participation is desirable not only to guarantee future 
generations of Olympic champions, but also, and mainly, to produce social and health benefits 
that are consequences of an active lifestyle.  This is a strong argument to justify huge amounts of 
public money invested in hosting processes of sporting mega-events (including investments in 
elite sport).  The idea is: public money is not being invested only to stage an event, rather it is 
                                                 
1 The winning plan was developed by the British firm AECOM, and it proposes the construction of four 
main arenas in the Olympic Park – the Olympic aquatics stadium, the velodrome, the tennis center, and the field 
hockey center, among other minor facilities. 
allocated in order to promote health and better quality of life for local residents.  Based on that, 
organizers and boosters of recent editions of the Games have struggled to connect the hosting to 
higher levels of sport participation in host communities. For example, Sebastian Coe, the 
chairman of the 2012 London Olympics, had asserted: “I will fight the nostrum that this is just 
about elite sport. The challenge is not whether we finish fourth or 20th in the medals table but 
what we do to convert big British moments into 10,000 more kids picking up sport” (Beard, 
2008). 
 
Research has been conducted to verify the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’, i.e., benefits to the 
host city/nation in form of increased popular participation in sports as a clear consequence of 
hosting sporting mega-events (Hogan & Norton, 2000).  Australian elite sports received an 
investment of A$ 1.16 billion (approximately US$ 1 billion), as part of the preparation to host 
the 2000 Sydney Olympics (Hogan & Norton, 2000).  Despite the investment, no evidence was 
found to suggest that a trickle-down effect was verified across the Australian population (Hogan 
& Norton, 2000).  Other studies ratified Hogan and Norton’s results, demonstrating no evidences 
of effects on mass sport participation across the country as a consequence of hosting the Games 
(Toohey& Veal, 2007; Veal, Toohey, & Frawley, 2012).  In a similar way, after hosting the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing, China has not experienced a boost in grassroots and participation sports 
(Feng & Hong, 2013).  In spite of previous examples of non-existent trickle-down effect, one of 
the pillars of the London 2012 bid was the promise of using the Games to boost sport 
participation for all in the UK (Girginov & Hills, 2008).  After winning the bid, mass 
participation in sports became “the key Olympic legacy” promise for London 2012 (Grix & 
Carmichael, 2012).  Considering that legacies are achieved over the years, it could be argued that 
it is still too early to make assertions about impacts of the 2012 Games on sport participation in 
the UK.  However, some scholars have already affirmed that such impacts are very unlikely to 
happen (Girginov & Hills, 2008; Grix & Carmichael, 2012; Hamer, Weiler, & Stamatakis, 
2014). 
 
Rio de Janeiro has also proposed that hosting the Games would be important to stimulate sport 
participation and healthy lifestyle in the country (Candidature file for Rio de Janeiro to host the 
2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2009).  However, so far, Rio’s organizing committee has 
developed only a few projects to promote a more active lifestyle among Brazilians in association 
with the Olympics.  The proposals outlined in Rio’s Olympic bid look, nowadays, as mere 
formalities to win the bidding process.  After Sydney 2000, support for sport participation has 
been part of bid campaigns, responding to one of the IOC’s ‘missions’. The Olympic Charter 
says that the IOC is expected “to encourage and support the development of sport for all” 
(Olympic Charter, 2007, p. 15).  Therefore, to be competitive in the bidding process, cities began 
adding topics related to improvement of sports for all, sport participation, and quality of life in 
their candidacies (even when they have no concrete plan to use the Olympics to increase sport 
participation). 
 
Few projects that tried to use the 2016 Games to promote sport participation are isolated actions, which 
have not been integrated into a larger plan.  For example, in March of 2013, ROCOG launched the 
sustainability management plan for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Rio2016, n.d.), which 
describes environmental, economic and social objectives of hosting the Games.  However, the plan 
does not mention sport participation, physical activity, or improvements toward an active lifestyle.  It 
is noteworthy that in the sustainability management plan website, ROCOG highlights sport 
participation: “We plan the Games with people in mind, in order to create benefits such as work 
experience, new knowledge, adoption of Olympic and Paralympic values and inspiration to practice 
sports” (Rio2016, n.d.). 
 
Among the above mentioned isolated actions, some interesting examples can be outlined.  In 
September of 2013, the 2016 Olympic Public Authority (OPA) joined a private program – Move 
Brazil, which started in 2012 with a goal to stimulate sport participation among Brazilians. This 
program was originally created by the Social Service of the Commerce (SESC), a private non-profit 
organization, which operates in the areas of education, health, leisure, and culture. The main purpose 
of the 2016 OPA is to coordinate federal, state, and municipal governments to oversee the preparation 
process for the 2016 Games, mainly to guarantee the fulfillment of the promises made to the IOC.  As 
mentioned previously, one of these promises was to promote sports for all.  Considering that the 
government’s perception of sport legacy is clearly biased toward elite sport (see 
http://www.apo.gov.br/site/legado/), apparently, OPA has decided to join an already existing private 
program to fill the gaps in the Brazilian government planning related to sport for all and sport 
participation as a consequence of hosting the Games. 
 
The city of Rio de Janeiro has two projects to promote sport participation as part of the 2016 Games 
plans: Olympic villages and the Olympic experimental gymnasiums. The municipal department of 
sport and leisure of Rio de Janeiro has built sport facilities – ‘Olympic villages’ – in ten different poor 
neighborhoods of the city. Managers of this project say that these spaces have been designed in these 
areas because they target underprivileged kids, who do not have sport-related leisure opportunities 
(CidadeOlímpica, n.d.).  Some of these villages have an interesting variety of facilities, including 
swimming pools. However, others are quite simple, offering basically a multi-purpose outdoor sport 
court and a skateboard track. 
 In another venture linking the 2016 Games to sport participation, the municipal department of 
education of Rio de Janeiro has built three Olympic experimental gymnasiums.  Basically, these 
gymnasiums are facilities, where elementary/middle school children can practice six Olympic 
sports (track and field, swimming, volleyball, handball, wrestling, and table tennis), as a 
complement their regular school schedule. Although the program stimulates sport participation, 
it cannot be defined as a sports-for-all initiative, for two different interrelated reasons. First, its 
main purpose is to prepare sport-talented youth to be elite athletes (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 
2011). Second, it targets students who already have experience with sport competition and are 
interested in sports (O Globo, 2012). 
 
Nationalism 
 
Sport is “perhaps one of the most powerful and visible symbols of national identity and nationalism” 
(Jackson, 2008, p. 351), and “[i]f hosting a major sporting event is already interpreted as a victory, 
actually winning a major international sporting competition provides even greater opportunities for the 
celebration of a nation” (Rowe, 1995, p. 137). Hargreaves (2002) discusses the relation between sport, 
nations and nationalism provoked by globalization, pointing to the media as the vehicle that positioned 
sport on a world scale. Politicians work to promote sport as a tool for strengthening the sense of 
national pride, “as a way of enhancing their state-nation’s prestige and influence internationally” 
(Hargreaves 2002, p. 32). 
 
In Germany during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, national pride became headlines of local newspapers 
highlighting that for the first time in over 60 years, Germans were not ashamed to be proud of their 
nation. In Germany, the country once divided into two nations (West and East Germany), and then 
unified in 1990, “the notion of ‘nationalism’ is often treated as extremely suspect … Claiming pride in 
Germany or, worse, pride in ‘being German’ can easily pigeon-hole a person as reactionary” (Schrag, 
2009, p. 1085).  In this scenario, one of the most important legacies of the 2006 FIFA World Cup was 
to improve Germans’ nationalism. Nationalism has been defined as a political, economic, and 
sociological phenomenon, which leads individuals to develop positive attitudes toward their own 
country (Druckman, 1994). 
 
The 2002 World Cup also boosted the sense of national identity for the two host countries, Japan and 
South Korea.  In Japan, “young people, who usually pay little attention to national symbols, sang the 
national anthem and wrapped national flags around themselves” (Takahashi, 2011, p. 495).  In South 
Korea, similar demonstrations of national pride were observed on match days. However, some authors 
have asserted that they were more a result of mainstream media coverage and the government actions 
to facilitate public celebration, rather than a genuine reaction to the competition (e.g., Hong, 2013). 
 
In Greece, when Athens hosted the 2004 Olympics, the goal was a redesign of national identity, taking 
the Games as “an opportunity to brand the look of a new Greece” (Traganou, 2009, p. 76).  During the 
Games, nationalism was everywhere.  However, after the Games, also due to the country’s economic 
crisis, nationalistic feelings decreased in Greece (Gatopoulos, 2010). 
 
When the topic is mega-events’ legacies in Brazil, very little concerning nationalism is discussed in the 
media, which, so far, focuses more on the issues described on the previous segments of this chapter – 
the tangible legacies.  This is no different for the 2016 Rio Olympics.  Demonstration of national pride 
is expected to be perceived during the Games in two ways: Fans cheering for Brazilian athletes at the 
events and celebrating wins in the streets; and/or, groups opposing the mega-event and protesting 
against the public money used to fund the Olympics. In both cases, the authors’ opinion is that the 
2016 Olympics should be useful to improve nationalist feelings not only during the Games, but also 
and mainly after them, as an important social legacy for the country. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Examining social impacts of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro can properly be done years 
after the event is finished. This chapter provided an outline of the social projects planned for the city in 
preparation for the Games and it can serve to guide future studies that hope to determine what were (if 
there were) the positives legacies of the mega-event in Rio.  So far, evaluation of legacies impacts is a 
neglected area of research (Bob &Kassens-Noor, 2012).  What can be said is that if all the projects 
planned by the organizing committee and the government of Rio for the 2016 Olympics are concluded 
as designed, there should be indeed some social legacies. 
 
Regarding people displacement, the literature demonstrates similar elements: poor communities, 
uneducated people, and an imminent need of cities’ gentrification as part of the hosting demands 
(Watt, 2013).  Showing a ‘perfect’ image of host cities and their people has been one of the most 
important objectives of hosting sporting mega-events.  This pressure has brought negative legacies 
such as removing any sign of poverty or underdevelopment from the public view (Kennelly & Watt, 
2011), which is the main motive to displace poor people from their homes– ‘out of sight, out of mind’. 
 
In terms of sport participation, the project of the Olympic Villages in poor neighborhoods seems to 
work as a stimulus to sport participation in the communities.  Besides that, the reality is that there is 
not an integrated plan for sport participation and only isolated programs have been implemented.  
Moreover, the program of gymnasiums for students of public school only targets children who already 
have interest and experience in sport.  Considering the potential for far-reaching impacts of the Games, 
and the amount of public money invested in the event, governments (federal, regional and municipal) 
should use the opportunity of the Games in Rio to promote sport participation all around the country. 
Unfortunately, it has not been done yet. 
 
Finally, in terms of strengthening of nationalism due to the 2016 Olympics in Rio, there has not been 
much debate.  The Brazilian government has counted heavily on national pride to promote the 2014 
World Cup (Nery & Coutinho, 2014). Since the protests against the mega-event began in 2013, 
Brazilians have demonstrated less enthusiasm for the event (Muzell, 2014). Protests have led the 
federal government to change the discourse about the World Cup: From emphasizing the legacies for 
the population to focusing on the pride of the ‘football nation’ hosting the mega-event, with the 
elaboration of the slogan Copa das Copas (The World Cup of the World Cups) (Nery &Coutinho, 
2014).  However, it is important to stress that protests are a form of demonstrating nationalism, 
considering that the groups against the mega-events in Brazil claim for a better country, focusing on 
improving social issues, from poor education and public health system, to public safety, and poverty. 
 
Social impacts represent important intangible legacies.  However, the scenario so far has shown that 
Brazil still does not have strategies to leverage all the possible social legacies sporting mega-events 
can leave to their hosts.  After hosting two mega-events back-to-back (the 2014 World Cup and the 
2016 Olympics), will Brazil become another example in the sports literature of a host country left with 
economic debt and no long lasting legacies? 
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